Abstract. Given the requirements of fast processing and the complexity of RF ranging systems, distance bounding protocols have been challenging to implement so far; only few designs have been proposed and implemented. Currently, the most efficient implementation of distance bounding protocols uses analog processing and enables the prover to receive a message, process it and transmit the reply within 1 ns, two orders of magnitude faster than the most efficient digital implementation. However, even if implementing distance bounding using analog processing clearly provides tighter security guarantees than digital implementations, existing analog implementations do not support resilience against Terrorist Fraud attacks; they protect only against Distance Fraud and Mafia Fraud attacks. We address this problem and propose a new, hybrid digital-analog design that enables the implementation of Terrorist Fraud resilient distance bounding protocols. We introduce a novel attack, which we refer to as the "double read-out" attack and show that our proposed system is also secure against this attack. Our system consists of a prototype prover that provides strong security guarantees: if a dishonest prover performs the Terrorist Fraud attack, it can cheat on its distance bound to the verifier only up to 4.5 m and if it performs Distance Fraud or Mafia Fraud attacks up to 0.41 m. Finally, we show that our system can be used to implement existing (Terrorist Fraud resilient) distance bounding protocols (e.g., the Swiss Knife and Hancke-Kuhn protocol) without requiring protocol modifications.
Introduction
Wireless localization solutions that emerged in the last decade [19] promise to support a broad set of security-and safety-critical applications, including people and asset tracking, emergency and rescue support [9] , secure routing [16] and access control [12, 24] . Given the sensitivity of location information in those applications, this information needs to be obtained and/or verified securely.
One of the most prominent problems in the field of secure localization is that of proximity verification: how can one device (the verifier) establish its distance, either exact or as an upper bound to another device (the prover). This problem was first introduced in [4] and prompted a design of a set of distance bounding protocols [29, 30, 14, 25, 20, 26, 5, 6, 21, 22, 27] . Broader deployment of wireless networks and the attacks on proximity-based access control systems (e.g., in cars [10]), routing [15] and payment systems [11] led to an increased interest in the design and implementation of distance bounding protocols [18, 29, 25, 13] . The security of these protocols was mainly analyzed against three types of attacks: Distance Fraud attacks, Mafia Fraud attacks and Terrorist Fraud. Distance bounding protocols were further formally analyzed in a number of works [2, 5, 3] .
Distance bounding protocols rely on the exchange of timed challenges and responses between the verifier and the prover. However, given that the prover is not trusted by the verifier and no assumptions can be made about its processing capabilities, the time that the prover spends in processing the verifier's challenge should be negligible compared to the measured round-trip time, which depends on the speed of light. If the verifier would overestimate the prover's processing time (i.e., the prover is able to process signals in a shorter time than expected), the prover would be able to pretend to be closer to the verifier. The challenge in implementing distance bounding protocols is therefore first to implement a prover that is able to receive, process and transmit signals in negligible time.
Although a number of protocols have been proposed, it is not clear if the proposed distance bounding protocols can be implemented with the required tight processing (and therefore security) guarantees or can be integrated within the existing RF ranging systems. For example, almost all distance bounding protocols assume that a prover will be able to receive a single bit of the challenge, XOR it or compare it with some locally stored value, and transmit the response; all within negligible time. XORs and comparisons require digital processing and the most efficient implementation in the open literature that can realize such distance bounding protocols requires 170 ns [28] and thus enables the attacker to cheat on its distance by at most 27 m. An alternative implementation of distance bounding protocols, using analog processing was proposed in [25] enabling signal reception/processing/transmission within 1 ns and thus provided a tight security guarantee of 15 cm. Instead of using XOR or comparison, this design relied on a processing function called Challenge Reflection with Channel Selection (CRCS), which can be implemented using only analog processing techniques. In [13] , a design for implementing a secure distance bounding channel for the rapid bit-exchange in a near-field environment was presented. The experimental implementation used improvised wideband pulses and achieved a distance bound of 1 m in the case of Mafia Fraud attacks and 11 m for Distance Frauds.
However, even if implementing distance bounding using analog processing techniques clearly provides tighter security guarantees than digital implementations, existing analog implementations do not support resilience against Terrorist Fraud attacks; they are only suited for the prevention of Distance Fraud and Mafia Fraud attacks. We address this problem and propose a new, hybrid
